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Abstract: 
 
This paper studies an outsourcing problem where two service providers (suppliers) compete for 
the service contract from a client. The suppliers face uncertain cost for providing the service 
because they do not have perfect information about the client's type. The suppliers receive 
differential private signals about the client type and thus compete under asymmetric information. 
We first characterize the equilibrium of the supplier competition. Then we investigate two of the 
client's information sharing decisions. It is shown that less information asymmetry between the 
suppliers may dampen their competition. Therefore, the client does not necessarily have the 
incentive to reduce information asymmetry between the suppliers. We characterize the 
conditions under which leveling the informational ground is beneficial to the client. We also find 
that under the presence of information asymmetry (e.g., when the suppliers have different 
learning abilities), sharing more information with both suppliers may enhance the advantage of 
one supplier over the other and at the same time increase the upper bound of the suppliers' quotes 
in equilibrium. Consequently, the suppliers compete less aggressively and the client's payoff 
decreases in the amount of shared information. The findings from this study provide useful 
managerial implications on information management for outsourcing firms. 
 
Keywords: service outsourcing | asymmetric information | information sharing | common value 
auction 
 
Article: 
 
Introduction 
 
The past few decades have witnessed the boom of outsourcing in which firms transfer their 
noncore business activities to third-party suppliers. Typical outsourcing areas include 
information technology (IT) management, services, manufacturing, logistics, and customer 
support (Goles et al. 2008, Halvey and Melby 2007, Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2005). The 
primary motivation for outsourcing is to maintain a competitive edge by reducing costs and 
focusing on core competencies. Today outsourcing has become a strategic lever in the global 
economy (Friedman 2005), and it is widely expected that the increasing trend of outsourcing will 
continue in the near future (Cohen and Young 2006, Stevens 2009). 
 
While the benefits of outsourcing are evident, its success hinges on how well the relationships 
between the outsourcing firm (client) and her suppliers are managed. This poses challenges for 
the client because the suppliers are usually independent entities with different information and 
self-interested objectives. One of the difficulties in outsourcing management is caused by the 
cost uncertainties involved in the transaction. In most outsourcing relationships, either the buyer, 
the suppliers, or both may possess some information that is not publicly known to the other 
parties. For instance, when a client outsources a certain task, she may not know the suppliers' 
exact costs for undertaking the task. The reason could be simply that the suppliers have private 
information about their technological capabilities and operational efficiency. We call this 
supplier-related cost uncertainty. As we will discuss in the literature review, this type of cost 
uncertainty is quite intuitive and has received enormous attention among practitioners and 
academics. 
 
Much less attention has been paid to the so-called client-related cost uncertainty, that is, the 
suppliers do not have full information on certain aspects of the transaction. Consider multiple 
suppliers bidding for an outsourcing contract from a client. Due to the complexity of the 
outsourced business process, none of the suppliers has perfect information about the actual cost 
for serving the client. In addition, the suppliers may have disparate information due to their 
different backgrounds, industry experiences, and information learning abilities. This type of cost 
uncertainty is prevalent in practice and may also play an important role in outsourcing decision 
making. 
 
A typical example of client-related cost uncertainty is IT security outsourcing. An increasing 
number of companies rely on Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs) to provide cost-
efficient solutions for their information security management. MSSPs offer a range of Managed 
Security Services (MSS), including security monitoring, vulnerability and penetration testing, 
network boundary protection, data archiving and restoration, etc. (Allen et al. 2003). The MSS 
market has been undergoing rapid growth in recent years. The global market of security 
outsourcing is forecasted to nearly double between 2011 and 2015, when it will reach a total 
value of $16.8 billion (Infonetics Research 2011). In IT security outsourcing, a MSSP's cost of 
providing MSS often depends on numerous factors, including the MSSP's own capabilities, the 
characteristics of the client he serves, and the match between the corporate cultures of the two 
firms. For instance, a client with a robust computer network, strict internal security policies, and 
well-trained employees may encounter fewer security problems (Allen et al. 2003); also a good 
match between the firms may foster cooperation and make it easier to develop collaborative 
solutions. It is therefore less costly for the MSSP to meet the performance expectation specified 
in the service level agreements (SLA). Although these factors are critical to the MSSP's service 
cost, usually the MSSP does not have perfect knowledge about them and therefore faces cost 
uncertainties in serving the client. 
 
The presence of client-related cost uncertainty may lead to information asymmetry among 
potential MSSPs in their competition for service contracts. Such information asymmetry can be 
attributed to two possible reasons. First, MSSPs may collect information and learn about service 
cost from different sources. For instance, some MSSPs develop better knowledge of their client 
from prior business interactions with the client (Gefen et al. 2008), some MSSPs try to learn 
about their clients through on-site pre-contract inspection (Allen et al. 2003), and some MSSPs 
obtain information about their clients via third-party information services, such as security 
ratings (Scalet 2008). Second, MSSPs may not have equal learning abilities even when they have 
access to the same information source. For instance, the insights gained from the same factual 
data depend on a MSSP's information processing capability and prior experience. It has been 
reported that tacit knowledge derived from social interactions cannot be fully captured in formal 
documents and reports (Gopal and Gosain 2010). Therefore, when competing for the service 
contract from a single client, potential MSSPs may have disparate information about the client 
and the uncertain service cost. 
 
Similar situations may occur in other outsourcing contexts as well. In the outsourcing of 
consulting and financial services, the output is usually determined jointly by the inputs from both 
the service provider and the client (Roels et al. 2010). Thus, the service provider's cost for 
achieving a certain output level depends on how diligent and responsible the client is, which 
could be unknown to the service provider. In customer care outsourcing (e.g., call center 
outsourcing), the cost for meeting contractual performance depends critically on the 
characteristics of the service offered to end customers (e.g., service complexity, customer 
demographics, and demand volume). Call center vendors may not have perfect information about 
these characteristics. The same issue may also arise in manufacturing outsourcing. For example, 
the original equipment manufacturer (outsourcer) may have superior information on products 
(e.g., the design and complexity of a new product) or market conditions (e.g., the potential 
market size) compared to the contract manufacturer (supplier). This information may affect the 
production cost as well as the revenue associated with the contract (Tan 1996). As in IT security 
outsourcing, in the above industries the external suppliers are often uncertain and asymmetrically 
informed about the cost for delivering the required services or goods to the client. These cost 
uncertainties may lead to problematic outsourcing relationships because underestimating the 
service cost may result in the winner's curse, where the winning supplier has to incur a loss from 
serving the client (see Kern et al. 2002 for a discussion of winner's curse in IT outsourcing). As a 
result, these cost uncertainties have been ranked as a primary contributing factor to contract 
renegotiation and termination in outsourcing practices (Halvey and Melby 2007). 
 
The above examples demonstrate that cost uncertainties and asymmetrically informed suppliers 
represent a common feature of many outsourcing settings. Obviously, when competing for the 
client's outsourced business (e.g., a service contract), suppliers' behaviors are influenced by their 
different beliefs about the service cost, which in turn determines the value of the contract. Thus it 
is crucial for an outsourcing firm to understand the impact of this information structure when 
designing her outsourcing strategy. However, there has been relatively little research in the 
operations management literature studying the outsourcing problem when suppliers are not 
equally informed about the uncertain service cost. This study attempts to shed some light on the 
problem by developing a game-theoretic model. In this model, two suppliers compete for a 
service contract from a single client. The service cost can be either high or low. The suppliers do 
not know the exact service cost, but they have a prior belief about its probability distribution. In 
addition, each supplier receives a signal about the service cost. The suppliers' signals are 
correlated, and one may be more accurate than the other. The winner of the contract is 
determined through competitive bidding; specifically, the suppliers simultaneously submit the 
price they would charge for the service and the lower bidder wins the contract. 
 
With this model setup, we first derive the equilibrium outcome of supplier competition. The 
characterization of the competitive outcome has useful implications on vendor selection and 
outsourcing strategy design for the client. Then we focus on the client's information-sharing 
strategies. The advances in information technology have facilitated the flow of information 
between trade partners. As a result, information sharing has been lauded in the literature as an 
effective means to improve supply chain efficiency (Chen 2003). In our problem setting, the 
client can influence the suppliers' information structure through information sharing. For 
example, the client may help the suppliers obtain better information about the service cost by 
disclosing internal documents and arranging on-site visits. Therefore, we study two important 
questions related to the client's information sharing decision as follows. 
 
First, what is the impact of supplier information asymmetry on the client's profit? This question 
has practical significance because a client may wish to know whether she should narrow the 
information gap via information sharing with the less-informed supplier. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that the client should benefit from a leveled information ground because it induces more 
supplier competition. In contrast, we find that reducing information asymmetry between the 
suppliers may hurt the client's profit under certain conditions. This is because less information 
asymmetry implies that the suppliers are more likely to receive the same signals, so it may either 
intensify or dampen the competition depending on the received signals. In particular, when there 
is a high level of information asymmetry between the suppliers, the dampening effect dominates 
the intensifying effect and the client's profit may decrease as the information gap diminishes. 
This result cautions outsourcing managers about their information sharing strategy and provides 
insights into the circumstances under which a client should strive to level the informational 
ground for competing suppliers. 
 
Second, how much information should the client share with the suppliers? By disclosing more 
information, the client may improve the accuracy of the signals observed by both suppliers. 
Interestingly, in our setting with information asymmetry (e.g., when the suppliers have different 
learning abilities), it has been found that sharing more information with both suppliers is always 
detrimental to the client. Although information sharing will improve both suppliers' signal 
accuracies, the quality difference in the suppliers' signals will also increase due to unequal 
learning abilities. In addition, information sharing also increases the suppliers' expected service 
cost contingent on bad signals, which is essentially the upper bound of the suppliers' quotes in 
equilibrium. These two effects lead to less aggressive bidding behaviors from the suppliers. As a 
result, sharing information with both suppliers has a negative impact on the client's payoff due to 
dampened supplier competition. This finding indicates that it is not always beneficial for the 
client to improve suppliers' signal accuracies. In other words, the existence of information 
asymmetry may hinder the client from improving suppliers' information, which has important 
implications on the information management policy for outsourcing firms. 
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 'Literature Review' reviews the related 
literature. Section 'Model Setup' introduces the model setup. Section 'Supplier Competition' 
analyzes the suppliers' bidding game. Section 'Information Sharing' studies the client's 
information sharing strategies and offers detailed answers to the above questions. Finally, the 
study concludes with section 'Conclusion'. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Internet-enabled marketplaces have gained increasing popularity during the past decade. In 
particular, the use of auctions as a procurement tool has been widely adopted in outsourcing 
practice due to the advances in information technology. This study is related to the growing 
literature in operations management that studies outsourcing and procurement auctions where a 
buyer procures a certain service or product from external suppliers with heterogeneous private 
costs. Reviews of this literature can be found in Cachon and Zhang (2006), Chen (2007), Wan 
and Beil (2009), and Zhang (2010), to name a few. Our model is different in that the suppliers 
incur uncertain but homogeneous costs in providing the products/services. In particular, the 
suppliers face uncertainties about the cost for serving the same buyer, which is a common value 
for different suppliers. 
 
Our study involves information sharing, so it is related to papers that study the impact of 
information sharing/information leakage in supply chains. Representative studies include Li 
(2002), Li and Zhang (2008), and Anand and Goyal (2009). Chen (2003) reviews the supply 
chain management literature on information sharing. A common assumption in this literature is 
that the supply chain structure is exogenously given. In contrast, the buyer in our model uses an 
auction for vendor selection, and we study how to improve the effectiveness of the auction 
through information sharing. 
 
In our model, the suppliers receive different but correlated signals about a common contract 
value, so their competition represents a common-value auction (CVA). Several studies in the 
CVA literature study asymmetrically informed bidders (i.e., the auctioned object is of identical 
value to the bidders but the bidders possess different amounts of information about such a value), 
and therefore are most relevant to our work. These CVA studies diverge in characterizing the 
bidders' profitability in competition. Some studies suggest that only the better-informed bidder 
can make positive expected profit (e.g., Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 1983, Hauswald and 
Marquez 2006), while other studies find that both the better-informed bidder and the less-
informed bidder can make positive expected profits (e.g., Banerjee 2005, Hausch 1987). Our 
study bridges the gap between these two groups by using a unified model to capture both cases 
and characterizing the conditions for each case to arise. 
 
A few CVA studies look into the issue of information sharing, that is, whether the seller has 
incentives to help improve the less-informed bidder's information. Wilson (1975) suggests that 
decreasing information asymmetry between the bidders would intensify their competition. 
Milgrom and Weber (1982b) also find that if the seller has access to some of the better-informed 
bidder's information, he can increase its profit by publicizing that information. Hausch (1987) 
and Banerjee (2005), however, find that decreasing the information asymmetry level may soften 
bidder competition and hence lead to lower seller revenue. Such a finding, though interesting, is 
based on some restrictive conditions. Hausch (1987) assumes that the better-informed bidder's 
estimate of the object value is negatively affected by the improved precision of the less-informed 
bidder's information. Due to the lack of tractability, Hausch (1987) relies on a numerical 
example to illustrate the finding. To simplify analysis, Banerjee (2005) assumes that the bidders 
never bid when receiving a bad signal. These approaches undermine the robustness of the results 
because they are based on either numerical analysis or constrained bidding behavior. In view of 
these limitations, we develop an analytical model that is not subject to these restrictions. By 
solving the suppliers' equilibrium bidding strategies, we analytically characterize the conditions 
under which information asymmetry may either intensify or dampen bidder competition. 
 
In addition to information asymmetry between the suppliers, we also study the sharing of 
information between the client and the suppliers. Milgrom and Weber (1982a) suggest that the 
seller should always honestly publicize all information she has. This is because honest reporting 
can reduce the bidders' private information and thus lower their information rent. However, in 
another Milgrom and Weber (1982b) study, they show that the seller may lower her expected 
profit by disclosing her own information when the seller's information is complementary to the 
better-informed bidder. In that study, complementarity essentially implies that the disclosure of 
the seller's private information increases the information asymmetry between the bidders, which 
dampens the competition in the auction. In our study, we find that when the client's information 
is complementary to both suppliers' information but the suppliers are equipped with different 
learning abilities, the client will not share her information with the suppliers either. Such a 
finding, though based on a different problem setting, is consistent with the insight from Milgrom 
and Weber (1982b). 
 
Model Setup 
 
A firm (client) needs to outsource her service process to an outside service provider (supplier). 
For ease of exposition, we consider the example of IT security outsourcing. The service has a 
value V for the client and there are two pre-qualified suppliers from whom the client can choose. 
The suppliers face uncertain cost for serving the client due to the reasons discussed in the 
Introduction. To focus on the information asymmetry issue, we assume that the suppliers are 
identical (e.g., they have the same technology and are equally efficient in delivering the required 
service) except that they may be asymmetrically informed about the client's service cost. There 
are two possible service costs, cl and ch (cl < ch < V). The low cost cl is associated with 
situations where the client would be less costly to serve (e.g., it is equipped with a sufficiently 
robust IT system) while ch is associated with the opposite situations. For easy reference, call the 
client a good (G) type if her service cost is cl, and a bad (B) type if her cost is ch. We use T to 
denote the client type and assume that T = G with probability Pr(G) = γ (0 < γ < 1) and T = B 
with probability Pr(B) = 1−γ. One may view γ as the fraction of low-cost clients in the market, 
which is public information. 
 
The suppliers possess asymmetric information about the client and the associated service cost. 
As mentioned earlier, such information asymmetry may be due to the differences in the suppliers' 
information sources and their learning abilities. Without loss of generality, suppose supplier 1 is 
better informed about the client than supplier 2. We model information asymmetry between the 
two suppliers as follows. Supplier 1 receives a signal S about the client type. The signal can be 
either good (g) or bad (b). Let Pr(g|T) and Pr(b|T) denote the probabilities of S = g and S = b, 
respectively, conditional on T ∈ {G,B}. Define 
 
 
 
That is, for a good type, the signal is g with probability λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) and b with probability 1 − λ; 
however, the signal from a bad type is always b. For instance, the bad client does not have the 
necessary infrastructure and managerial capability to provide a friendly task environment, so the 
better-informed supplier seldom receives a good signal based on the client's reputation in the 
industry. 
 
The assumption in Equation (1) is used to improve the transparency of the analysis, and it can be 
generalized without affecting our main results. For instance, we have also analyzed a more 
general model where the signal from a bad-type client is g with probability β (0 ≤ β ≤ λ) and b 
with probability 1 − β. Our main model corresponds to the special case with β = 0. Another 
special case is when λ = 1 − β = (1 + ψ)/2, where supplier 1 receives symmetric signals from the 
two types of clients, that is, the signal from a good-type (bad-type) client is g(b) with probability 
(1 + ψ)/2 (0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1) and b(g) with probability (1 − ψ)/2. It has been found that the qualitative 
insights remain unchanged in these more general models. 
 
We may view λ as the quality of the signal. When λ = 1, the signal provides perfect information 
about the client's type; when λ = 0, the signal is useless because it is always bad regardless of the 
client type. Throughout the study we focus on λ > 0 to avoid the trivial case. Let Pr(g) and Pr(b) 
denote the probabilities of S = g and S = b, respectively. Then we have Pr(g) = γPr(g|G) + (1 − 
γ)Pr(g|B) = γλ, Pr(b) = 1 − Pr(g) = 1 − γλ. We emphasize that the signal S is informative in the 
sense that the supplier will be more certain about the client's true type after observing S. To see 
this, let Pr(T | S) represent the posterior probability that the cost type is T ∈ {G,B}, given the 
signal S ∈ {g,b}. Based on Bayes' rule, we may calculate 
 
 
 
Thus a good signal S = g indicates that the client has a low cost for sure, while a bad signal 
suggests that the client is more likely to have a high cost. 
 
Let E[C] be the supplier's expected service cost without any signal and E[C|S] be the expected 
service cost with a signal S. It can be readily shown that 
 
 
 
That is, a good (bad) signal g (b) implies a lower (higher) expected cost. Note that the signal is 
unbiased sinceE[C] = E[C|g]Pr(g) + E[C|b]Pr(b). 
 
Supplier 2 cannot observe the signal S. For instance, supplier 2 is a new entrant and does not 
have much information about the client's type. We assume he receives a garbling of supplier 1's 
signal, denoted . The value of  can be either good ( ) or bad ( ). Let  and  be 
the probabilities of  and , respectively, conditional on S. Define 
 
 
 
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 captures the extent of the garbling. When ρ = 0, the signal is useless for 
supplier 2 because for a given S, he receives with equal probability. However, as 
ρ increases, it becomes more likely that represents the same signal as S; that is, the information 
asymmetry between the suppliers diminishes. When ρ = 1, the suppliers are equally informed, 
and there is no information asymmetry anymore. Hence we may use ρ as a control of asymmetric 
supplier information. Note that with ρ = 1, the suppliers are identical ex ante and the game 
reduces to Bertrand competition. 
 
To examine the quality of the signal , we derive the posterior probabilities of the client type 
conditional on supplier 2's noisy signal: 
 
 
 
It can be readily shown that  and , where the 
equality holds only when ρ = 1. This means that S is indeed a more accurate indicator of the 
client's type than . A couple of points are worth noting here. First, due to the stochastic nature 
of the signals, S does not necessarily dominate  for all possible realizations; for example, 
supplier 1 may receive a bad signal S = bwhile supplier 2 may receive a good signal  from 
a good type client. Second, although a bad type client always sends a bad signal S = bto supplier 
1, supplier 2 may still receive a good signal . This is again because supplier 2's signal is 
more noisy than supplier 1's. 
 
Given the signal , the expected service cost perceived by supplier 2 
is , where  and  are the posterior 
probabilities of S = g and S = b respectively, conditional on . Based on the Bayes' rule, 
there are 
 
 
Then we can show the following relationship among the expected service costs (all proofs are 
presented in Appendix S1). 
 
 
 
The client knows that supplier 1 has superior information about the service cost compared to 
supplier 2. However, like the suppliers, the client does not have perfect information about the 
service cost. Recall that the service cost depends on numerous factors, many of which are 
random and not perfectly known to the client (e.g., service complexity, suppliers' capabilities, 
match between the firms, and demand uncertainties). Therefore, we assume that the client knows 
the probability distribution (i.e., γ) but not her exact type. This is a standard treatment in the 
common-value auction literature that assumes the seller does not know the exact value of the 
auctioned object. We have also examined the other extreme case where the client has perfect 
information about her own type. The qualitative insights from the main model are quite robust in 
both extreme cases. 
 
The sequence of events in our model is as follows. First, the client announces the request for 
quote (RFQ); second, both suppliers receive their private signals about the client's type (i.e., 
supplier 1 observes S and supplier 2 observes ); third, both suppliers simultaneously send their 
quotes to the client, each specifying a fixed fee (price) pi (i = 1,2) that the supplier would like to 
charge for the service; next, the client awards the service contract to the supplier with the lower 
quote (in case of a tie, the client awards the contract by flipping a fair coin); lastly, the winning 
supplier delivers the service as required to the client. 
 
We focus on the fixed-fee contract because it is quite simple and relatively easy to implement in 
practice. In fact, it has been commonly used in service outsourcing: The client announces a 
service contract to outsource (the contract may provide details about the outsourced service and 
specify the required service levels); then the suppliers bid for the contract on price. We assume 
that both the client and the suppliers are risk neutral and aim to maximize their expected payoffs. 
In addition, everything is common knowledge except the cost type T and the two signals S and 
 
 
Define social surplus as the sum of the payoffs of all parties in the system. In our setting, it is V 
− E[C], where E[C] = γcl + (1−γ)ch. Let π1 and π2 denote the two suppliers' expected payoffs, 
respectively. Then the client's expected payoff is equal to the difference between the social 
surplus and the sum of the suppliers' payoffs, that is, Π = V − E[C] − π1 − π2. 
 
Supplier Competition 
 
This section studies the equilibrium outcome of the Bayesian game played by the suppliers. In 
our model setting, the suppliers' game can be characterized by a common-value auction. In this 
auction, supplier i (i = 1,2) chooses a quote pi to maximize his expected payoff πi. When ρ = 1, 
the signals S and  are identical, that is, the suppliers always obtain the same information. They 
engage in Bertrand competition, and the equilibrium strategy is to quote E[C | g] when receiving 
signal g and E[C | b] when receiving signal b. Information asymmetry is present when 0 ≤ ρ < 1. 
The following proposition states that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in the game in the 
presence of information asymmetry between the suppliers. 
 
Proposition 1. No pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the suppliers' quoting game when ρ < 1. 
 
Next we derive the mixed-strategy equilibrium for such a game. 
Let  denote supplier 1's mixed strategy in equilibrium, 
where  is a cumulative distribution function conditional on the signal S. Similarly, 
let denote supplier 2's mixed strategy in equilibrium. Then supplier 1's 
expected payoff function can be written as 
 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (9) is supplier 1's expected payoff when 
supplier 2 receives a signal , and the second term is the expected payoff when supplier 2 
receives . Supplier 2's expected payoff function is given by 
 
 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (10) is supplier 2's expected payoff when 
supplier 1 receives a signal S = g, and the second term is the expected payoff when supplier 1 
receives S = b. Equation (10) differs from Equation (9) in that the expected service cost changes 
with supplier 1's signal. This is because supplier 1's signal is more accurate than supplier 2's. 
 
We first characterize the equilibrium of the supplier game for ρ = 0. When ρ = 0, supplier 2 does 
not obtain any meaningful information from the signal. The distribution of supplier 2's signal 
reduces to . Supplier 2's posterior beliefs are the 
same as his prior beliefs. In 
particular,  and . 
The competition is essentially between a privately informed supplier and an uninformed supplier. 
The next proposition presents the suppliers' equilibrium quoting strategies. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose ρ = 0. The suppliers' equilibrium strategies can be characterized as 
follows: (i) supplier 1 quotes  when observing S = b and quotes according 
to  when 
observing S = g. (ii) Supplier 2 ignores the signal  and quotes according 
to  
 
We next consider 0 < ρ < 1. It turns out that for any given pair of probabilities Pr(g) and Pr(b), a 
unique equilibrium exists and the equilibrium structure depends on the relationship between 
Pr(g) and Pr(b). Proposition 3 presents the firms' equilibrium strategies for the case Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b) 
(or equivalently, ), that is, supplier 1 is more likely to receive a bad signal. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose 0 < ρ < 1 and Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b). The suppliers' equilibrium strategies can be 
characterized as follows: (i) supplier 1 quotes   when observing S = b, and quotes 
according to 
 when 
observingS = g. (ii) Supplier 2 quotes  when observing  and quotes 
according 
to   
 
when observing  
 
It is worth mentioning that for Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b), supplier 2's expected payoff is always zero 
regardless of his signal. However, supplier 1's expected payoff is  when 
he receives a good signal and 0 when he receives a bad signal. That is, less accurate information 
about the client type puts supplier 2 in a disadvantageous position. To help understand 
Proposition 3, Figure 1(a) depicts the support of the suppliers' quotes. 
 
Proposition 4 characterizes the suppliers' equilibrium strategies for the case Pr(g) > Pr(b) (or 
equivalently, ), that is, supplier 1 is more likely to receive a good signal. 
 
Proposition 4. Suppose 0 < ρ < 1 and Pr(g) > Pr(b). The suppliers' equilibrium strategies can be 
characterized as follows: (i) Supplier 1 quotes  when observing S =b, and quotes 
according to 
 
 
 
when observing S = g, where the cutoff levels  and p  are defined in the proof. (ii) 
Supplier 2 quotes according to  when 
observing  and quotes according to  
 when observing  where the cutoff levels  and  are defined in the 
proof. 
Figure 1(b) illustrates the support of the suppliers' quotes for Pr(g) > Pr(b). Similar to the 
previous case with Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b), supplier 1 will quote E[C | b] when observing a signal S = b. 
However, when supplier 1 observes a signal S = g, he will randomize his quote over [p,E[C | b]], 
whose lower bound p is higher than its counterpart under Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b). This suggests 
that supplier 1 competes less aggressively than in the previous case. To see what causes this 
difference, we may examine the condition Pr(g) > Pr(b). This condition can be rewritten as 
 
 
 
Figure 1. An Illustration of the Suppliers' Equilibrium Quoting Strategies 
 
Note that the left-hand side of Equation (11) is supplier 1's expected payoff if he undercuts the 
quote E[C | b] and only wins when supplier 2 receives . The right-hand side is supplier 1's 
payoff if he quotes and wins for sure regardless of supplier 2's signal. The 
inequality in Equation (11) indicates that unlike in the case Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b), now it is not optimal 
for supplier 1 to always beat supplier 2. Instead, supplier 1 would rather bet on the chance that 
supplier 2 receives and only win in that case. Therefore, supplier 1 competes less 
aggressively when he receives S = g. 
 
Given the above equilibrium outcomes, Proposition 5 characterizes the suppliers' expected 
payoffs in equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 5. (i) Suppose ρ = 1. Both suppliers' payoffs are zero in the equilibrium. (ii) Suppose 
0 < ρ < 1. In the equilibrium, supplier 1's expected payoff is always positive, while supplier 2's 
expected payoff is positive if Pr(g) > Pr(b), and is zero otherwise. Supplier 1's expected payoff is 
always higher than that of supplier 2. (iii) Suppose ρ = 0. Supplier 1's payoff is positive while 
supplier 2's payoff is zero in the equilibrium. 
 
Consider the general situation 0 < ρ < 1. When Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b), only supplier 1 (i.e., the more 
informed supplier) earns a positive rent. This is the case where the more informed supplier has a 
single-side information advantage (SIA) as observed in the auction literature (e.g., Engelbrecht-
Wiggans et al. 1983, Hauswald and Marquez 2006). When Pr(g) > Pr(b), both suppliers can 
enjoy positive expected payoffs. This is the case with double-side information advantages (DIA). 
The fact that supplier 1 does not observe supplier 2's private signal enables supplier 2 to also 
earn an information rent, even though supplier 2's signal is not as good as supplier 1's. 
 
The above result reveals that the client has to leave a positive information rent to the suppliers as 
long as ρ < 1 (i.e., the suppliers have asymmetric information about the service cost). 
Nevertheless, having two suppliers is always better than having just a single supplier from the 
client's perspective. When there is no supplier competition, a single supplier with strong 
bargaining power will quote V and extract all the surplus. However, when there are two suppliers 
competing against each other, they will bid down to E[C | b] or lower. That is, supplier 
competition ensures that the client makes a positive profit, even if the suppliers are 
asymmetrically informed. 
 
Information Sharing 
 
The preceding section characterizes the equilibrium outcome of supplier competition. It has been 
shown that the outcome of the bidding game hinges upon the suppliers' information structure. In 
most practical situations, the client can influence the suppliers' information structure through 
information sharing. For example, the client may help the suppliers obtain better information 
about the service cost by disclosing internal documents and arranging on-site visits. This section 
proceeds to study the client's information sharing strategies. Specifically, we are interested in the 
two questions raised in the introduction: First, what is the impact of information asymmetry 
between the suppliers on the client's profit? Second, how much information should the client 
share with both suppliers? The following two subsections analyze these two questions and derive 
some useful managerial insights. For simplicity, we assume that the cost of information sharing 
is negligible for the client. 
 
Changing p via Information Sharing 
 
In our model, information asymmetry exists because supplier 2's information is not as accurate as 
supplier 1's. The difference between the suppliers' signals S and  is defined by the parameter ρ 
as in Equation (5). When ρ is larger (smaller), the two signals are more (less) similar or the 
degree of information asymmetry between the suppliers is lower (higher). Thus, we use ρ ∈ [0,1] 
to measure the similarity between the suppliers' signals. This subsection examines the impact of 
this information asymmetry on the client's profit. Clearly, if less information asymmetry leads to 
higher profit, then the client would have incentives to reduce information asymmetry between 
suppliers (increase ρ) via information sharing. For instance, if the client has access to some of 
supplier 1's information, then the client may increase ρ by sharing that information with supplier 
2. We next analyze the client's optimal information sharing strategy on ρ. 
 
A natural conjecture would be that decreasing information asymmetry will intensify competition 
because it levels the ground for the suppliers. For example, the suppliers' bidding game boils 
down to Bertrand competition when ρ = 1, which erodes the suppliers' payoffs. As a result, the 
client may always want to reduce information asymmetry between the suppliers, for example, by 
sharing supplier 1's information that is available to her with the less-informed supplier. The 
intuition is consistent with the findings in the auction literature (e.g., Milgrom and Weber 1982b, 
Wilson 1975) and appears to be a prevalent view among practitioners as well. The IT 
outsourcing case study by Kern et al. (2002) links weak competition to ex ante supplier 
asymmetries and recommends that the client should assist the disadvantageous supplier with 
information gathering. However, we find that this intuitive idea is not always valid in our model 
setting. Propositions 6 and 7 illustrate how the suppliers' and the client's expected payoffs vary 
with ρ. 
 
Proposition 6. (i) When Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b), supplier 1's expected payoff is decreasing in ρ, and 
supplier 2's expected payoff is always zero (independent of ρ). (ii) When Pr(g) > Pr(b), there 
exist ρ1 and ρ2 (0 ≤ ρ1 < ρ2 < 1) such that supplier 1's expected payoff is increasing in ρ for ρ ∈ 
[0,ρ1] and decreasing in ρ for ρ ∈ (ρ1,1], and supplier 2's expected payoff is increasing in ρ for ρ 
∈ [0,ρ2] and decreasing in ρ for ρ ∈ (ρ2,1]. 
 
The above result indicates that the supplier competition is not necessarily more intense when 
there is less information asymmetry. The explanation for this result is as follows. As ρ increases, 
there is less information asymmetry between the two suppliers, so they are more likely to receive 
the same signal. Consequently, supplier 2 will quote more aggressively when receiving a good 
signal, because he is more confident that supplier 1 also receives a good signal. On the other 
hand, supplier 2 will compete less aggressively when receiving a bad signal, because it is more 
likely that supplier 1 also receives a bad signal. Therefore, an increase in ρ generates two 
countervailing effects on the supplier competition: an intensifying effect and a dampening effect. 
 
When Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b), the dampening effect does not exist. This is because Proposition 3 shows 
that supplier 2 (and supplier 1) will always quote the highest possible bid E[C|b] when receiving 
a bad signal. Due to the intensifying effect, an increase in ρ always leads to more intense supplier 
competition and drives down supplier 1's profit. When Pr(g) > Pr(b), both the dampening effect 
and the intensifying effect exist. In this case, supplier 1 is likely to receive a good signal. When ρ 
is large, supplier 2 is also more likely to receive a good signal due to the low level of information 
asymmetry. Consequently, the intensifying effect dominates the damping effect and an increase 
in ρ intensifies the supplier competition, whereas, when ρ is small, supplier 2 is more likely to 
receive a bad signal due to the high level of information asymmetry between the suppliers. As a 
result, the dampening effect dominates the intensifying effect and an increase in ρ softens the 
supplier competition. Overall, the suppliers' payoffs are quasi-concave in ρ in this case; that is, 
they first increase and then decrease to zero at ρ = 1. 
 
An interesting implication of Proposition 6 is that under Pr(g) > Pr(b), it might be in the 
suppliers' best interest to bilaterally share their information. When the level of information 
asymmetry is high (i.e., ρ < ρ1), both suppliers will benefit if the better-informed supplier reveals 
his information to the less-informed party (until ρ = ρ1 is achieved). Further, when the level of 
information asymmetry is low (i.e., ρ > ρ2), the less-informed supplier prefers to ignore some of 
the available information and doing this also benefits the better-informed supplier as well. 
 
Proposition 7. (i) When Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b), the client's expected payoff is increasing in ρ. (ii) When 
Pr(g) > Pr(b), there exists ρ0 (0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ0 < ρ2 < 1), where ρ1 and ρ2 are given in Proposition 6 
such that the client's payoff is decreasing in ρ for ρ ∈ [0,ρ0] and increasing in ρ for ρ ∈ (ρ0,1]. 
 
Proposition 7 shows that the client's payoff is not always monotonically increasing in ρ. In other 
words, reducing information asymmetry between the suppliers may hurt the client's payoff. This 
yields useful insight on how the client should manage supplier information asymmetry. In an 
ideal situation where the client can fully control the parameter ρ, she should remove supplier 
information asymmetry completely by setting ρ = 1. That is, the client can help the less-informed 
supplier achieve a signal that is as accurate as the better-informed supplier's. The suppliers' 
payoffs are squeezed to zero, and the client extracts all the surplus from the system. However, a 
more realistic assumption is that the client only has limited control of information asymmetry. In 
many practical situations, it might be hard to completely eliminate information asymmetry 
between the suppliers. Consider the example where one of the suppliers is an incumbent with 
prior business experience with the client. There are many factors that prevent an entrant supplier 
from gaining exactly the same client information as the incumbent. For instance, the client may 
not have access to all of the incumbent supplier's information; it is very likely that the 
information acquired from third-party information sources is not as accurate as the information 
inferred from the first-hand data. In addition, even if the entrant supplier can use pre-contract on-
site investigation to learn about the client, it is still unable to obtain certain tacit knowledge, for 
example, the employee conduct and organizational culture at the client firm. The incumbent 
supplier, however, may have a better understanding of these intricacies through his past 
interactions with the client. Under these circumstances where the client can only slightly reduce 
information asymmetry (e.g., ρ is always smaller than ρ0), it might be optimal for the client to 
maintain a high level of information asymmetry between the suppliers, especially when Pr(g) >  
Pr(b). Such information asymmetry can intensify the supplier competition. Our result cautions 
the client about her information disclosure strategy under these situations. Interestingly, reducing 
information asymmetry between the suppliers may make the client worse off if the current level 
of information asymmetry is relatively high (ρ < ρ0). In other words, helping the less-informed 
supplier is beneficial to the client only when the supplier's information disadvantage is not very 
significant. 
 
The above result also illustrates how the client's information disclosure strategy depends on the 
distribution of the client type (measured by γ) and the signal quality (measured by λ). The above 
counterintuitive result holds only for Pr(g) >  Pr(b) or . So if there is a large proportion 
of high-cost clients or the signal quality is sufficiently low (i.e., Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b) because γλ is 
small), then the client always has incentives to help the less-informed supplier achieve a more 
accurate signal. This can level the competition ground and thus induce more aggressive quoting 
from the suppliers. Otherwise (i.e., Pr(g) > Pr(b) because γλ is large) the client's payoff does not 
necessarily increase as the level of information asymmetry between suppliers decreases. A useful 
implication is that if the client could make investments to either become a better type (increase γ) 
or improve the signal quality (increase λ), her information disclosure strategy may change 
accordingly as γλ passes the threshold value  
 
Changing λ via Information Sharing 
 
The above subsection studies the first question, that is, whether the client wants to reduce 
information asymmetry between the suppliers. This is essentially about information sharing with 
the less-informed supplier. In this subsection, we continue to address the second question, that is, 
whether the client wants to disclose information to both suppliers. By disclosing more 
information, the client may improve the accuracy of the signals observed by both suppliers. This 
can be done through various means, such as clarifying the service requirements and disclosing 
more internal documents to the suppliers. However, as discussed earlier, the suppliers may have 
different learning abilities; that is, they may not generate the same understanding of the service 
cost from the disclosed information. For example, a supplier who has more industry experience 
or is located closer to the client can better interpret the data shared by the client. Hence, under 
the presence of information asymmetry between the suppliers (e.g., when the suppliers have 
different learning abilities), it is not clear whether sharing more information is always beneficial 
to the client. 
 
This question can be addressed by examining the impact of λ on the client's profit. Notice that in 
our model, λ is a proxy for the quality of the suppliers' signals. When λ = 0, supplier 1 always 
receives bad signals, and his posterior beliefs about a client's type after receiving a signal, S, are 
the same as the prior beliefs. That is, Pr(G|g) = γ and Pr(B|b) = 1 − γ for λ = 0. Similarly, from 
Equations (6) and (7) we know  for λ = 0. When 0 < λ < 1, 
with a bad type, supplier 1 always receives a bad signal, but for a good type, he receives a good 
signal with probability λ < 1. So a good signal (S = g) confirms a good-type client, whereas a bad 
signal (S = b) indicates a bad-type client with a probability of  (see Equations (2) and (3)). 
This probability (1−γ)/(1−γλ) increases with λ; that is, a higher λ leads to a more accurate signal 
for supplier 1. To illustrate the effect of λ on supplier 2's signal quality, we may examine the 
posterior probabilities of the client type given in Equations (6) and (7). It can be verified that 
both  are increasing in λ. That is, a higher λ also leads to a more accurate 
signal for supplier 2. When λ = 1, supplier 1's signals are perfect and supplier 2's signals are least 
noisy. 
 
From the above discussion, we may use λ as the extent to which the client shares information 
with both suppliers. Sharing more information improves λ, which implies that the quality of both 
suppliers' signals improves. Generally speaking, ρ may also change as the client shares more 
information; however, allowing a variable ρ introduces significant difficulties into the analysis. 
So, for the analysis below, we focus on the benchmark case where ρ is fixed. In fact, now we 
may view ρ as a measure of the difference in the suppliers' learning capabilities, which are 
exogenously determined. 
 
Proposition 8. Consider a fixed ρ < 1, that is, there is information asymmetry between the 
suppliers. (i) When Pr(g) ≤ Pr(b), supplier 1's payoff is increasing in λ, and supplier 2's payoff is 
always zero. (ii) When Pr(g) > Pr(b), both suppliers' payoffs are increasing in λ. (iii) The client's 
expected payoff is always decreasing in λ. Therefore, the client's optimal decision is to choose 
the lowest possible λ. 
 
Proposition 8 presents a surprising result: improving the suppliers' information always negatively 
impacts the client's payoff. Why does the client suffer from more accurate supplier signals? 
Intuitively, the client should be willing to send more accurate signals. This will motivate the 
suppliers to quote more aggressively because a good signal is associated with a low service cost. 
However, we find that the opposite is true in our model setting. The competitive intensity 
between suppliers is lower given more accurate signals. 
 
We next take a closer look at how the suppliers' quoting strategies vary with λ. As λ increases, 
supplier 1 is more likely to receive a good signal given a good type client. Supplier 1 is more 
confident that a bad signal indicates a bad type client, which suggests a higher E[C | b]. 
Proposition 3 shows that the suppliers randomize their quotes over  when Pr(g) 
≤ Pr(b). The more accurate signals enable supplier 1 to better estimate E[C | b] and quote more 
conservatively to avoid losses. This will in turn make supplier 2 compete more cautiously. On 
the other hand, as λ increases, supplier 2 also receives more accurate signals. Supplier 2 is more 
confident that a good signal  indicates a good type client and is willing to lower his quote 
when . This forces the suppliers to compete more aggressively. The aggressiveness of the 
suppliers is determined by the trade-off between these two effects. The overall expected prices 
quoted by the suppliers are monotonically increasing when Pr(g) ≤  Pr(b). This suggests that the 
suppliers will compete less aggressively when they are given more accurate signals. 
 
When Pr(g) >  Pr(b), the suppliers randomize their quotes over [p,E[C | b]] as shown in 
Proposition 4. Increasing λ results in a higher E[C | b] and a lower , suggesting that 
condition (11) is more likely to be met and the suppliers are less willing to lower their prices. 
Therefore, the lower bound of the suppliers' quotes, p, is also increasing. The overall expected 
prices quoted by the suppliers are monotonically increasing in λ when Pr(g) > Pr(b), which again 
suggests less intense competition between the suppliers. 
 
We emphasize that even though ρ is fixed, changing λ will affect the quality difference between 
the suppliers' signals. When ρ < 1, the suppliers do not benefit symmetrically from the increase 
in λ (i.e., more accurate signals). When λ increases, both suppliers' information quality improves, 
but the improvement for supplier 2 has to be discounted by ρ. Therefore, the quality difference 
between the suppliers' signals becomes greater as λ increases. 
 
However, notice that the change in quality difference caused by λ and that caused by ρ have 
different implications on supplier competition and the client's payoff. While increasing the 
quality difference by decreasing ρ is good for the client in certain cases (i.e., when ρ < ρ0 and 
Pr(g) > Pr(b)), increasing the quality difference by raising λ is always bad for the client. Such a 
distinction can be explained as follows. Recall that changing ρ only affects the signal quality of 
the less-informed party; in contrast, changing λ will improve both firms' signals. In particular, it 
can be shown that the suppliers' expected service cost, E[C | b], is constant in ρ but convexly 
increasing in λ. Since E[C | b] is the upper bound of the suppliers' quotes, a higher E[C | b] 
implies less aggressive bids from the suppliers. Therefore, while the client may benefit from a 
greater quality difference caused by varying ρ, a greater quality difference caused by increasing λ 
hurts the client. 
 
This study presents an interesting case in which the client does not strive to improve suppliers' 
information in service outsourcing. This complements the findings in the literature. Milgrom and 
Weber (1982b) show that the seller may not share information with all bidders when the seller's 
information is complementary to only the better informed bidder's information. The 
complementary information will enhance the better informed bidder's information advantage and 
thereby hurt the seller's profit. We find that when the client's information is complementary to 
both suppliers' information and the suppliers have distinct abilities to learn from the released 
information, information disclosure may widen the information gap between the suppliers and 
thus dampen the competition. As a result, the client has no incentive to disclose any information 
to the suppliers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The practice of outsourcing has been increasingly used in the industry as a competitive strategy 
in the fast-changing, global market environment. Understanding how firms should design their 
outsourcing strategies and manage the relationships with the suppliers is critical to the success of 
outsourcing. This study is motivated by the phenomenon that in many outsourcing contexts, the 
suppliers' cost for serving a client is dependent on various factors including, the characteristics of 
the client. Since the suppliers do not have perfect knowledge about these factors, they do not 
know the exact cost for serving the client either. This in turn leads to asymmetrically informed 
suppliers because they learn about the client through different information sources with diverse 
information accuracy. In this study, we study a client's outsourcing problem where two suppliers 
compete for the client's service contract under asymmetric beliefs about the service cost. The 
main findings and insights from this study can be summarized as follows. 
 
We first identify the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the suppliers' game for any given information 
structure. A pure-strategy equilibrium generally does not exist in the presence of information 
asymmetry; however, we are able to derive the unique mix-strategy equilibrium. It has been 
shown that in the equilibrium, the better-informed supplier always enjoys a positive (expected) 
payoff, and it is higher than that of the less-informed supplier. The less-informed supplier's 
payoff can be either zero or positive, depending on the parameter values. This means that in our 
model framework, both SIA (where only the better-informed supplier earns an information rent) 
and DIAs (where both suppliers have positive expected rents) may arise. 
 
Then we examine how information asymmetry between the suppliers affects the client's 
performance. It has been found that reducing information asymmetry between the suppliers does 
not necessarily improve the client's payoff. In particular, helping the less-informed supplier 
obtain more accurate information about the service cost may hurt the client's payoff. This is 
because the bidding behavior of the less-informed supplier depends on his signal: he would 
compete more aggressively when the signal indicates a low service cost, but less aggressively 
when the signal indicates a high cost. As improving the signal accuracy will make the less-
informed supplier more confident about the true cost, it may induce either more or less 
competition depending on the realization of the signal. Either of these two effects may be 
dominant under different circumstances. Therefore, the client does not always benefit from 
reducing information asymmetry between the suppliers. 
 
The above finding on the impact of information asymmetry provides useful insight into the 
client's information management strategy. Conventional wisdom suggests that the client should 
assist the suppliers with more information gathering in order to level the playground of 
competition (see, e.g., Kern et al. 2002). In contrast, we have demonstrated in a reasonable 
setting that sharing information to reduce supplier information asymmetry may dampen 
competition and lower the client's payoff. To be specific, when there is a sufficiently large 
proportion of high-cost clients in the market, the suppliers compete more aggressively when 
there is a low level of information asymmetry; on the other hand, when the proportion of low-
cost clients is large, the supplier competition could be more intense when the supplier 
information asymmetry is either very high or very low. In IT security outsourcing, for example, 
this implies that when the client companies generally have a robust IT infrastructure, they need 
to be careful when sharing information because their profit may not monotonically change with 
the level of information asymmetry. 
 
In this paper, we also study a common situation where the client can improve the quality of the 
suppliers' signals by disclosing more data to both suppliers. Under the presence of information 
asymmetry between the suppliers (e.g., when the suppliers have different learning abilities), we 
address the question of whether sharing more information is beneficial to the client. 
Interestingly, we find that the client has no incentive to share any information with the suppliers. 
The reason is that the suppliers will not benefit equally from the shared data; in addition, the 
suppliers' expected service costs contingent on bad signals will be higher, which leads to less 
aggressive quotes. Therefore, sharing more information with both suppliers is detrimental to the 
client. This suggests that the existence of supplier information asymmetry may hinder the client's 
information sharing effort in outsourcing. Thus, understanding the information structure between 
suppliers is critical for a client when devising her information management strategies. 
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